Contested Terrain: The Convict Task Work System, 1788-1830 by Robbins, Bill
Contested Terrain: The Convict Task Work System, 1788-1830 
Bill Robbins 
School of Business, Charles Sturt University 
There is ample evidence that for at least the first thirty years of white 
settlement in New South Wales work and its control was contested 
terrain. During these years there was a complex, vibrant and at times 
fierce struggle between convict workers and the colonial managers 
of convict labour. This should not be surprising given that criminal 
conviction and transportation did not fundamentally resolve the basic 
labour management issue of the control of the labour process. It 
may have established the cost of convict labour power to the State, 
the price of convict labour, but it left untouched the challenge of 
making convict workers productive, extracting labour use. Arguably, 
extracting labour use from convict workers was more complex in 
New South Wales than it may have been in many parts of British 
industry. The convict labour force was perhaps even more hostile to 
its work environment, less motivated, was under skilled, poorly 
supervised and often physically unsuited to the work demanded of it 
due to illness or previous lifestyle. Convict workers and managers 
also had fewer or less resilient traditions upon which to rely than 
free workers and employers in Britain. 
While it is true that colonial managers of convict labour had 
great powers of coercion there were in practice many limitations to 
these. Governors could allocate convicts to any work they wished 
but in reality up to 1822 were motivated more by the rational than 
the whimsy or pathological. The physical punishments that could be 
imposed by the State were also highly significant and loom large in 
the convict work experience but there were such clear limitations to 
brutality that its use was moderated until the early I 820s. It must be 
appreciated that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
public violence was commonplace and modem sensibilities can 
exaggerate the distress this caused.! But more importantly, flogging 
damaged individual workers and significantly lowered their 
productivity without measurably maximising the efforts of other 
workers.2 Productive workers, particularly skilled ones, were critical 
to the colonial economy. Hanging too had clear shortcomings as a 
mechanism for controlling a labour force. Other forms of punishment 
like working in chains were also understood by Macquarie's Principal 
Superintendent of Convicts, William Hutchinson, to have inherent 
limitations.3 
The convict system, on the other hand, denied the State the most 
fundamental labour control mechanism possessed by all private 
employers; dismissal. Unlike private employers in Britain (and even 
in New South Wales) the government, as the owner of convict labour 
power, had an indissoluble employment contract with all convicts. 
It could not dismiss convicts from its employment as a means of 
imposing control over the labour process. Nor could it use dismissal 
as a threat. If a convict could not be assigned to a private settler or 
was returned to the government, it had to find work for that worker 
and support him or her by providing a legally specified quantity of 
rations and clothing. The suffering caused by unemployment to a 
free workforce had no impact on the way management treated or 
organised its convict work force. There was also no Reserve Army 
of Labour, or at least not one that could influence the nature of convict 
employment. While it is true that convict workers could not legally 
or freely choose their employer, there is evidence that they 
consciously tried to position themselves within the labour 
market. Convicts concealed or invented skills in order to 
influence their allocation to specific types of work' and they displayed 
a preference for different types or locations of public work. 5 However, 
they were most active in exploiting the distinction between private 
and public sector employment, often manipulating their allocation 
from one to the other'i. To understand the convict work experience it 
is essential to recognise the limitations that bonded employment 
imposed on management and not just on the convict worker. 
It can be argued that the need to extract labour use from a 
workforce is a motive possessed only by management concerned 
with surplus value. Historically the profit motive is certainly one of 
the major mechanisms that fuelled the collective evolution of 
management practice and strategy. However, the public sector can 
be as equally motivated by the need to make its labour force as 
productive and as cheap as possible. This productivity concern also 
makes the extraction of labour use from labour power a critical 
management task. The colonial authorities of New South Wales from 
1788 to about 1822 were no exception. The economic circumstances 
of white settlement in New South Wales during these years demanded 
that convict labour be made as productive as possible. This 
productivity imperative created the elaborate and large gang system 
of organising male convict labour. A Colonial bureaucracy and 
sophisticated management strategies were also developed in order 
to administer and improve the work by the many gangs of convict 
workers, particularly during the Macquarie years. It was only after 
1822 that the growth in the public employment of male convicts in 
work gangs began to slow while their administration became 
increasingly concerned with the imperative of punishment. 
For the first 34 years of white settlement colonial managers of 
convict labour were vitally involved in extracting labour use from 
convicts. This was achieved not simply by terror but through the 
adoption of increasingly sophisticated ways of organising work, of 
supervising it and of motivating the convict workers. Although the 
State possessed the power of coercion this did not give it absolute 
control of the labour process because male convict workers were by 
no means powerless. As will be seen convict productivity and work 
effort were the outcome of interaction between convict managers 
and workers over the contested terrain of the labour process. An 
effective analysis of this interaction and, in particular, the 
management and convict strategies adopted at different times are 
well beyond the scope of a paper such as this. However, this paper 
will examine one of the most enduring management strategies 
developed to extract a minimum quantity of work from male convicts: 
Task Work. 
Task Work: a compromised management strategy 
One of the earliest and most important strategies developed by 
colonial managers of convict labour was the Task Work system. Task 
Work was an official designation of a minimum quantity of work, or 
quota for individual convicts or more frequently a gang of convict 
workers, which had to be achieved on either a per day or per week 
basis. Commissioner Bigge explained it very well in his Report of 
1822 when he observed it was "adopted more for the purpose of 
securing and ascertaining that a certain quantity of labour 
[was 1 performed, than of stimulating the quicker performance 
of it".7 In other words, it was not designed or could not be 
-
'* 
enforced in ways that maximised convict work effort but was intended 
merely to extract an acceptable minimum quantity ofwork. The penal 
system of New South Wales, despite drastic powers of coercion, 
recognised the inherent and covert bargaining power of convict 
workers in the labour process and calculated a minimum rather than 
a maximum level of labour productivity. 
Task Work began within the first months of the settlement. Faced 
with shortages offood and other essentials like accommodation and 
the fact that many of the convicts were in poor physical health, 
Governor Phillip was required to minimise the hours of convict 
labour.8 As a consequence Phillip allowed convicts time off from 
their public employment in order to grow food and build 
accommodation for themselves and for the officers. The nature of 
initial settlement created a distinction and ultimately a conflict 
between private and government time. In order to balance these 
interests Phillip negotiated acceptable minimum quantities of public 
work with the male convict workers and so established the system 
of Task Work.9 This action alone was highly significant. Although 
the convicts were not free, Task Work required the State to consult 
and negotiate with them. 10 
At around the same time Captain Hunter introduced Task Work 
on Norfolk Island. He did this in order to extract an acceptable 
minimum amount of work from his workforce but also to address 
falling labour productivity caused by poor supervision and convict 
hostility to government work. Hunter explained that he: 
" . adopted the plan of tasking [the convicts], for which purpose I 
consulted those whom I thought conversant in the different 
employments that were carrying on: and their opinions, added to 
what I observed myself, determined me to fix the different tasks as 
follow, with which the are all content. Six men to cut the timber 
down on an acre of ground a week: six men to clear away and tum 
up an acre of ground fit for receiving seed, in twenty-eight days: 
two sawyers to saw one hundred feet of sawying each day. At these 
tasks the convicts would have an opportunity of saving time to 
themselves; and, as that time was to be employed in clearing gardens 
and ground to cultivate for their own use, what was thus saved from 
public work would not be lost to society; although it has been feared 
that some would pass their time in idlenessY 
In practice Task Work was an effort to balance public and private 
work interests. Where the Task Work was set too high the convicts 
would have had insufficient time to provide for their own lodging 
and other needs. Set too low and the convicts would have been able 
to meet their private needs with time to "loiter about the streets to 
the great annoyance of the inhabitants, and pass their time in gambling 
and riot". 12 However not all convicts had the same marginal utility 
for pleasure. Governor Hunter discovered that the sawyers at the 
Hawkesbury settlement did not waste their free time but used it in 
more enterprising ways. These sawyers had set their own Task Work 
at some earlier stageD but by 1798 this was, in his opinion, too low 
and was "no longer to be allowed". 14 The lowness of their Task Work 
meant that these sawyers had a great deal of free time on their hands 
which, in a spirit of enterprise, they used by selling their services to 
the highest bidder - sometimes a private settler, sometimes even the 
government. With a low Task Work quantity these sawyers were 
free to spend considerable time working for themselves while the 
scarcity of their skills and the demand for building materials meant 
they were able to earn significant wages. It was their success that 
must have particularly upset Hunter. 
Task Work as a system of determining work quantity and 
therefore effort also offered convict workers other benefits. As a 
system of work organisation it encouraged the male convicts 
the convicts. IS In this sense, Task Work must also be seen as a crude 
motivational device. It encouraged productivity although did not 
maximise it. However, apart from giving them free time and some 
independence Task Work also altered the nature of supervision. In 
the initial decade of settlement supervision was concentrated on 
establishing that the Task was actually completed rather than on the 
detailed control of the work performance itself. This reflected the 
poor quality and scarcity of supervisors within the convict system 
but it offered male convicts a degree of self-management. More 
significant was the fact that despite clear signs in the early 1800s 
that Task Work was not operating as effectively as it might in the 
State could not abolish it or extend hours of work to a full day or 
week. Instead Governor King attempted to make it more productive 
by setting official Task Work for a variety of work in March 1801.16 
He established the following wage and Task Work rates: 
Per Acre WeekS Work 
falling forest timber ?O 100 I acre 
Burning off ditto 1.50 65 rod 
Breaking up new ground 1.4.0 65 rod 
Ditto stubble/corn 0.13.4 130 rod 
Chipping in wheat 0.6.8 I? acre 
Reaping in wheat 0.8.0 I acre 60 rod 
Threshing wheat (per bushel) 0.0.7 18 bushels 
Planting corn (per acre) 0.6.8 I acre 
Hilling corn (ditto) 0.6.8 I acre 
Pulling & Husking Corn (ditto) 0.0.5 25 bushels 
Pale splitting 6ft per hundred 0.2.6 800 (2 men) 
Pale splitting 5ft per hundred 0.2.0 1000 (2 men)17 
Interestingly this Regulation not only established the Task Work 
required of convicts employed by the government in gangs or 
individually but also for convicts assigned to free settlers. Any male 
convict who had finished his Task Work had to be paid according to 
the wages rates above for any additional work. Essentially these Task 
Work rates remained the required amount or quota for the work listed 
until at least after the Bigge Inquiry and despite Macquarie's 
discomfort with Task Work generally.18 Indeed, Macquarie seems to 
have been unable to abolish it outright although the construction of 
the Prisoner Barracks in Sydney was an elaborate strategy in the 
struggle to remove, ifnot Task Work, then at least its most transparent 
justification; the need of convicts to earn sufficient income to support 
themselves. Over the years new occupations or activities were added 
to the calculation and some rates were increased. A notable example 
of the latter was again the case of the sawyers. Their Task Work 
increased significantly but fitfully during and after the Macquarie 
years but there is evidence that, unlike others, they resisted these 
increases. Druitt confessed, 
I have had more trouble with the Sawyers than any other Description 
of convicts, & I attribute it to my obliging them to do a greater Portion 
of work than ever they Did before ... 19 
In 1817 Druitt not only increased their Task Work from "450 
feet per week each pair" to 700 feet but required them to cut more 
demanding types oftimber such as Iron Bark, Stringy Bark and Blue 
Gum as well as the customary cedar, a very soft wood20. In raising 
this Task Work Druitt also increased the rations given the sawyers 
by half, but those at Pennant Hills 
to finish their Task as quickly as possible and this effectively 
reduced the number of hours worked for the government by EJ 
. .. in a body refused to do it; This continued for two or three weeks 
when H.E. The Govr. [sic] Requested me to visit the Settlement & 
and to speak to the people to represent to them that they were 
only asked to perform the same work as their fellow prisoners 
did in the Lumber Yard. I did so & there was a general murmur 
r throughout the whole body; & two men stepped fOlward close to 
me; & said if all the men were of their way of thinking, that nothing 
more than the old task should be done, as they considered the ration 
of a pound & a half of beef & a pound & a half of flour not near 
Sufficient for a man to work hard upon. They were extremely insolent 
& I have no doubt wd. [sic] have made an attack upon me had not a 
resolute Overseer been near me & ready to offer assistance.2! 
Escaping from these 'striking' sawyers Druitt reported the 
situation to Governor Macquarie who ordered that the two spokesmen 
be flogged the following morning. Each was given 100 lashes "The 
Greatest Punishment" that Druitt remembered ever being inflicted." 
This swift and punishing response broke the strike "& from that day 
the usual task required at the Lumber yard was performed by the 
Sawyers at Pennant Hills"23. This example highlights not only the 
power ofthe state over employment relations within the penal system 
but also that convicts did quite openly resist. The actions of the 
Pennant Hills sawyers, it should also be remembered, would have 
probably been illegal for free workers. However, a postscript to this 
dispute offers yet more evidence of convict bargaining power. 
Defeated in their overt actions the sawyers resorted to more covert 
resistance. Although the Task Work was increased, by 1820 it was 
widely known that the sawyers were still completing this additional 
workload with time to spare. The Task Work for "the Government 
was done on Thursday Evenings of every week".24 In other words 
the sawyers still withheld productive capacity from the government 
and finished their government work by Thursday leaving Friday and 
the half Saturday to be used in paid employment for themselves.2s 
They performed more work but could have performed even more. 
Nevertheless, the government did not further raise the Task Work 
despite a shortage of building timber. This acquiescence seems to 
have arisen in part from the reality ofthe sawyers' covert bargaining 
power.26 
Other male convict workers, however, managed to balance 
government and private work demands and ambitions with less 
obvious conflict. The Grass Cutters Gang was employed in Sydney 
to cut grass to feed government horses and those of the military 
officers. The way the work of this gang was organised illustrates not 
only the Task Work system in operation but also the reward system 
that was used to motivate some gang workers. 
Those of the grass-cutters that are well conducted, are allowed to 
lodge in the town [Sydney], and after they have procured the quantity 
that is given as a task to each man, they are allowed to dispose of the 
surplus for themselves; those likewise who have been able to furnish 
on the Fridays the quantity required for that day and the Saturday, 
are allowed the use of the government boats to procure it for 
themselves on the Saturday, and to sell it in the town. The daily task 
to the grass-cutters has been raised lately from 40 to 60 bundles of 
grass for each man ... 27 
There is no evidence that the grass-cutters resisted this increase 
in their Task Work. However, it is clear that, to encourage an 
acceptable minimum level oflabour productivity from the convicts 
employed in this gang, a number of very significant concessions 
were given to them. If well behaved they were able to enjoy 
independent life-styles outside the Barracks and in this way 
minimised the penal system's regulation of their lives. Task Work, 
in a sense, divided a convict's work effort into publicly and privately 
owned spheres. As long as the convict grass-cutter produced the 
required Task Work during his public employment he was then 
allowed to work in a private capacity for part of the day or week. 
And it was in this latter capacity that the system allowed reward for 
greater personal effort. When working for themselves the 
convict grass-cutters could increase their personal rewards by 
increasing their work effort. But more than this, the personal or private 
work effort of these convicts was subsidised by the public sector. 
Government property, in the form of the boats, tools and even the 
vacant land upon which they harvested the grass, was freely made 
available to them. In other words, the State sanctioned private 
enterprise amongst those convicts who conformed to acceptable 
habits and patterns of behaviour. 
By the middle of the Macquarie period the modification or setting 
of Task Work for new jobs was determined by senior administrators 
(management): the Chief Engineer, Principal Superintendent of 
Convicts and even the Governor. While Superintendents, Principal 
Overseers and Overseers may have been consulted they had no formal 
or consistent input into the calculation of Task Work. Similarly, male 
convict workers seem to have lost any overt role in the setting of 
Task Work during Macquarie's administration. Of course this is not 
to say the convicts were an unimportant consideration in the setting 
of Task Work, only that their participation was covert. Given the 
stability of Task Work and the slow response of government to abuses 
or low levels of productivity, the spectre of convict resistance is very 
apparent up to 1822. However, after this date the ability of convict 
workers to resist management control of the labour process was very 
significantly reduced. 
After Macquarie Task Work as a strategy fell into disuse. 
Governor Brisbane abolished many of the convict gangs that worked 
under Task Work28 and reallocated convict workers to his new 
Clearing Gangs.29 These were gangs of male convicts employed to 
clear new or existing land for free settlers at a price per acre. In 
regulating the work ofthe convicts within these gangs there was no 
direct reliance on Task Work. Each gang consisted of 22 convict 
workers and a convict overseer and they were expected on average 
to clear 15 acres per month but this was not a Task Work calculation.30 
The varying physical conditions in different parts of the country 
would have prevented any meaningful standard of work but more 
importantly there was no longer any need for Task Work. Brisbane 
designed extremely complex organisational structures and 
bureaucratic controls to measure and monitor gang work performance 
while overseer motivation was improved with monetary rewards and 
convict motivation with extra rations.3! With these reforms control 
over and the motivation of the overseers were both improved, thus 
addressing the traditional weaknesses of the convict system in New 
South Wales; the poor quality and unreliability of the overseers. 
Governor Darling, Brisbane's successor also made no use of Task 
Work. While he abolished the Clearing Gangs and many ofthe other 
convict gangs he imposed even more elaborate structures of control 
on the convict labour process. Darling reformed the Road Gangs 
and imposed the stringent and often brutal working conditions that 
are commonly used to describe the convict work experience. Men 
worked lumbered to logs of wood or in leg and sometimes also neck 
irons. Even worse were the Penal settlements some of which 
provided "the last penal infliction short of death".33 Under Darling 
the hours of government work were extended to sun-up to sun set 
and by 1827 the government had access to the whole of a convict's 
working day34. The only exception made to these hours of work were 
for some skilled mechanics in Sydney, who were still aIJowed Friday 
and Saturday to work for themselves. This leniency was because 
this arrangement had "prevailed so long that it could not without 
some risk and great injury to the Town and Inhabitants be put a stop 
to".35 However, in general terms the removal or abandonment of 
Task Work, as a management labour process strategy was symbolic 
of the defeat of convict resistance. The government no longer needed 
to make the concession that Task Work represented to male 
convict workers. This change occurred because the 
administrative efficiency of Darling was so great and because 
the labour of male convicts was no longer as important to the 
government. While the road gangs performed useful and even 
productive work36 there is no escaping the realisation that these gangs 
were equally concerned with punishment and terror. Public 
employment of the convicts was quite deliberately intended to punish 
convicts and to strengthen the managerial prerogatives of private 
employers of convicts. 37 By 1830 the relative importance of convict 
workers had changed for the government and with this came a decline 
in their ability to contest the control of the labour process. 
Who Worked Under Task Work 
The convicts most likely to perform their work under Task Work 
were those whose work could be most easily quantified. These 
included the convicts in the Brickmakers Gang, the Bricklayers Gang, 
the sawyers at Pennant Hills, the stone cutters who were essentially 
working with formed blocks of stone, most ofthe agricultural gangs 
as well as the Shell Gang and Grass Cutters Gang.38 At Emu Plains 
convict workers were "required to fell the timber on an acre of land 
in the course of a week; and in buming it off, he is required to perform 
ten rods per day".39 The Brick makers Gang was another in which 
Task Work was an appropriate method of extracting an acceptable 
level of labour productivity. As Barrie Dyster explains, brickmakers 
worked in teams or 'sets'. 
'A set' of brick makers mined the earth, put it through the pug-mill, 
pressed it into separate sanded moulds, emptied each brick from its 
mould onto a pallet which, when full, was taken by barrow to drying 
racks and left for several days before the bricks were stacked in the 
kiln.40 
In 1820 a brickmaking set of29 convicts produced 25,000 bricks 
per week.41 In 1825, Major Ovens estimated a brickmakers Set 
consisted of only 15 men but they still produced 24,000 bricks per 
week.42 Although the stone cutters were highly skilled, it seems that 
because they were generally working with formed blocks of stone 
their work too could be more reliably quantified. 43 Druitt claimed 
stone cutters were required to cut 16 superficial feet a day while 
"The good Stone masons are obliged to perform three perch of rough 
work Per day".44 
On the other hand there were a number of gangs whose work 
could not practicably be quantified into meaningful Task Work. The 
most obvious example ofthese were the road gangs.45 Nevertheless 
attempts were made. John Ford, the overseer of a Windsor Road 
Party working at the Parramatta end was in Bigge's estimation "one 
of the best and most experienced of overseers" partly because he 
used his skill to attempt to set Task Work for his gang.46 He attempted 
to set the amount of work that 30 convicts working with six carts 
could consistently achieve in two monthly periods. While he may 
have been successful for his gang working on their stretch of the 
Windsor Road, Bigge concluded that this Task Work could not be 
applied elsewhere. As a consequence, the road gangs were regulated 
by senior administrators fixing "a daily quantity of labour 
proportionate to the difficulties and obstructions that occur"47 on 
individual sections of individual roads. In this way the unique 
difficulties posed by local terrain could be taken specifically into 
account. 
Another example of a non-Task Work gang was the Town Carters 
Gang. The work of the carters would have varied from load to load 
while delays and interruptions to their workflow would have been 
unpredictable and often beyond the control of the workers or 
overseers involved. Similarly, the boat crews were not on Task Work. 
Their work, "governed by the state of the tides and wind",48 would 
have made Task Work meaningless. It also appears that few 
work of the quarrymen, blasters and stone labourers was perhaps 
considered too variable or immeasurable for Task Work calculations 
for reasons similar to the road construction gangs. As Dyster explains 
"Stone differed from place to place, in grain, colour and ease of 
working ... [while] ... convicts named one public quarry 'Heaven' 
and another 'Hell' because of the difficulty of winning rock from 
the latter" .49 
Conclusion 
In terms of Labour process theory the reasons why the management 
of labour adopts any strategy is often as important or as interesting 
as what that strategy is. Task Work, as a management labour process 
strategy, was relatively benign. It set minimum not maximum levels 
of work effort and in doing so offered male convicts a significant 
range of benefits. Their hours of work were variable and generally 
their working day was relatively short. It also gave them considerable 
free time in which to normalise their lives and which, particularly 
significantly, gave them access to a money-based private labour 
market. In addition, Task Work reflected poor quality supervision 
and so convict workers enjoyed a less direct style of supervision. 
Moreover, the nature of supervision encouraged the negotiation of 
flexible work arrangements between overseers and convictworkers50. 
Some bribed their overseer with a share of private earnings to be 
absent from their gangs during working hours or they extracted a 
less strenuous work regime. Task Work also left intact the male 
convicts' ability to manipulate their work effort as the case of the 
sawyers illustrated. And for these concessions, the State only 
managed to extract a minimal level oflabour use, despite its enormous 
powers of coercion. 
Clearly then, why this labour process strategy, with all its 
drawbacks for the State, was introduced and remained so durable is 
a vital issue. The simple and most critical reason was simply that for 
most of the period 1788 to 1822 the State desperately needed the 
labour ofthe convicts. Whatever the penal objectives of transportation 
were for the British government the economic realities that faced 
each successive Governor until after Macquarie demanded the 
effective utilisation of convict labour. Punishment could not be the 
prime objective of transportation in New South Wales. It had to be 
work because there was simply so much infrastructure that needed 
to be established. However, this merely highlights the vulnerability 
of the State in the employment relationship, its does not explain the 
actual strategy of Task Work. Although the State needed productive 
convicts it could not, in practice maximise labour use for a variety 
of reasons. Firstly, the mechanisms of work control were so crude 
and corrupt. The quality of work supervision was an immediate and 
enduring problem while the convict overseers generally could not 
be trusted to drive their subordinates. Secondly, other work or 
organisational controls were also highly underdeveloped. Allocating 
convicts to work they were qualified or experienced in was a difficult 
administrative function from Governors Phillip to Macquarie. 
Measuring and inspecting the work of gangs was also a difficult 
administrative task. Although Macquarie gradually imposed an 
increasingly efficient and certainly more rational bureaucratic 
administration, the zenith of this structure awaited Governor Darling 
in the second half of the l820s. A third reason was the limited effect 
of the use of physical punishment to compel convicts to work harder. 
On the other hand, the use of positive incentives was hindered by 
the cost consciousness of British governments as Governors Hunter 
and Macquarie were quick to complain. A final constraint on the 
State's development of more effective labour process controls was 
the bargaining power of the male convict workers themselves. 
of the quarry or stone gangs were subject to Task Work. The 
EJ 
Some male convicts openly resisted management attempts to 
increase their work efforts but many more were able to exploit 
I 
I 
r·:· , , , , their important economic role in the colony to covertly thwart management. 
The abandonment of Task Work in the 1820s was a symptom of 
the maturity of the government's control of the labour process but it 
also reflected the declining importance of convict labour to it. The 
increasing numbers of convicts transported to New South Wales and 
the allocation of 2/3rds of them to private settlers signalled the end 
of an economically critical public sector. The government no longer 
needed convict workers. In addition, the bureaucratic controls 
introduced by Brisbane and Darling were much more extensive and 
effective in controlling the labour process. Both introduced new and 
more levels of supervision and administration, recruited more reliable 
overseers who were better motivated and developed more stringent 
methods of work measurement and accountability. They also both 
increased the level of punishment inflicted on convict workers. By 
the mid 1820s Task Work was an unsophisticated and irrelevant 
management strategy. The male convicts lost the protection of a high 
and sustained demand for their labour and had to battle with a more 
mature and elaborate network of management controls. They 
continued to resist and contest management's control of the labour 
process but their ability to do so was much reduced. 
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